Wednesday, May 20, 2009

India IGIF 2009


Freedom House Freedom on the Net




India


Population: 1.1 billion

Internet Users/Penetration 2006: 40 million / 4 percent

Internet Users/Penetration 2008: 82 million / 7 percent

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2006: 166 million

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2008: 347 million

Freedom of the Press (2008) Score/Status: 35 / Partly Free

Digital Opportunity Index (2006) Ranking: 124 out of 181

GNI Per Capita (PPP): $2700

Web 2.0 Applications Blocked: No

Political Content Systematically Filtered: No

Bloggers/Online Journalists Arrested: Yes















Status: Partly Free


Obstacles to Access: 11 (0–25)

Limits on Content: 8 (0–35)

Violations of User Rights: 15 (0–40)

Total Score: 34 (0–100)





Introduction


New media took hold in India during the mid-1990s, with mobile-phone services and commercial internet connections first made publicly available in 1994 and 1995, respectively.1 These services expanded rapidly in the late 1990s, with an increasing number of mobile service providers entering the Indian market, as well as with the opening up of the internet-service provider (ISP) sector in 1998 through the Central Government’s New Internet Policy.2 Most major public encounters with state-driven attempts to monitor and regulate access to these technologies began during the first half of the current decade. Internet freedom in India faces threats, however, particularly due to increasing state regulation in response to the authorities’ rising abilities to control the internet, as well as regulation by different private interests and local political groups.


Obstacles to Access


Infrastructure limitations and cost considerations restrict access to the internet and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) in India. Though regarded by some as the country with the fourth-highest number of internet users globally, the degree of internet penetration in India is low. Although the actual figures are disputable given that different sources have presented different findings,3 the cited figure of 82 million internet users in India pales in comparison to the total population, representing a maximum penetration rate of approximately 6.9 percent of the population.4 Within this, there is a pronounced urban-rural digital divide, with the approximate rural user base only 5.5 million. Thus, on average, there are at least ten times more urban internet users than rural internet users in India.5 While approximately 37 percent of India’s internet users access the internet via cybercafes, the number accessing the internet from home computers has increased.6 Low literacy rates are also a major obstacle in permitting many Indian citizens to use the internet, especially in rural areas.7 Though growing, the availability of internet content in India’s eight most widely-spoken languages is poor, with the current number of local language websites as low as 1,500.8

The overall mobile phone penetration figures are much better, with around 31 percent of the population using mobile phones, and the total national mobile subscriber base estimated at 347 million.9 Despite the global economic crisis and the high level of poverty in India, the mobile phone market continues to increase at an astonishing rate; statistics indicate that in September 2008, India’s mobile market grew at the rate of four new phone subscribers every second.10 While Indians use SMS messaging as a feature of their mobile phones, the number of messages is generally lower than in surrounding countries due to higher taxes on SMS messages. Since the deregulation of the telecom and ISP sectors in the late 1990s, users in India have had a choice between a number of different public and private providers. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL; a state-owned public enterprise) and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL; formerly state-owned and now privately-owned) are the two service providers with the most dominant market share, followed by wholly private service providers such as Sify Limited, Bharti Infotel, and Reliance Communications, among others.11

By and large, there has been no sustained government policy or strategy to block access to most categories of internet technologies or digital applications. Attempts to filter content have originated at the level of executive action by state governments, as well as by private individuals through court cases. Such attempts have focused on ordering ISPs to block access to social networking websites such as Orkut due to concerns about content,12 as well as to block access to Google Earth due to national security concerns.13 In November 2008, Indian authorities reportedly asked citizen journalists to stop updating their Twitter accounts with information on the Mumbai terrorist attacks, arguing that the posts were creating a security threat.14 There is currently no sustained blocking of entire online media services or blogging platforms; the widespread blocking of Geocities in 2003 and blogging platforms in 2006 were the result of over-blocking by ISPs in the process of carrying out the government-mandated filtering of specific sub-domains, causing the collateral blocking of entire websites.15 In May 2008, the central government threatened to ban Research-in-Motion’s Blackberry service from continuing to operate in India due to the firm’s refusal to facilitate the interception and decryption by Indian government agencies of information communicated across its network.16

The Telecom Regulatory Authority (TRAI) of India is the main regulatory body with respect to telecommunications matters; however, the scope of its regulatory power over internet matters in India is somewhat unclear given that the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology, along with the Ministry of Home Affairs, also exercise control over several aspects of internet regulation. TRAI functions as an independent regulator with public consultations and other participatory decision making processes, while the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology and the Ministry of Home Affairs function as government departments tied to the ministerial structure of the central government.


Limits on Content


Prior to 1999–2000, the then state-owned company VSNL had a monopoly in the ISP sector and sporadically filtered internet content. The two main publicly-known instances during this time pertained to blocking access to the website of The Dawn, a Pakistani newspaper, for the duration of the Kargil conflict.17 Since 2003, the institutional structure of internet censorship and filtering in India has centred around the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN), a body within the Department of Information and Technology. This body was created by a 2003 executive notification to be a nodal agency for accepting and reviewing requests from a designated pool of government officials to block access to websites. When CERT-IN decides to block a website, it directs the Department of Telecommunications to order all Indian ISPs licensed by it to comply with this order.18 Among the noteworthy instances of such blocking was the Yahoo! group Kynhun (linked to the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council) in 2003, and 17 various websites and blogs in 2006.

Police agencies in different states have also played a role in attempting to mandate internet censorship and surveillance, most notably in the state of Maharashtra.19 Instances in which websites and blogs were blocked due to national security, secessionist, and hate speech threats took place in 2003 and 2006, but were disjointed in their technical operation and were more event-specific in nature.20 There has been no sustained state-mandated process of internet censorship or blocking, though some reports indicate that more sophisticated filtering mechanisms are being installed at the level of ISP gateways at the instruction of the central government.21

The Indian blogosphere is quite active, complimenting the rise in internet use by different interest groups as well as by civil society actors. The actual number of bloggers, though, still appears to be quite low, and the blogosphere is potentially fragmented given the large number of blogging platforms available.22 Online communication and social networking services are increasingly being used as means to organize politically, as evidenced by prominent instances such as the meetings and rallies organized to protest the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, the outcry against the blocking of blogging platforms in 2006, and social mobilization movements such as Blanknoise, among others.23 Bloggers utilized the internet to voice concern and frustration over the inadequacy of government security capabilities after terrorist attacks throughout 2008, questioning that bombings were becoming a regular occurrence in India and predicting which city would fall victim next.24 There was also extensive debate on the blogosphere over attacks on Christians by groups of radical Hindu nationalist rioters in various Indian states.25


Violations of Users’ Rights


Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution explicitly protects the right to freedom of speech and expression, subject to reasonable restrictions that the state can impose. However, its application vis-à-vis internet content has not yet been directly clarified by a judicial ruling, though positive remarks regarding its applicability have been made in passing in cases decided by the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court of India.26 Article 19(1)(a) has also been held to apply—along with the right to life and liberty under Article 21—to the privacy of telephone communication, with guidelines established regulating the ability of state officials to intercept communication under the broad power granted to them by the Telegraph Act.27

The legal landscape for internet communication is laid out by statutes such as the Telegraph Act, the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the specialized provisions of the Information Technology Act (ITA). The ITA, enacted in 2000, was extensively amended by Parliament in December 2008 in three significant ways. First, it penalizes those who refuse orders from authorized state agencies to intercept or decrypt information. Most notably granting legislative sanction to the central government’s power to order that a website be blocked. It may be argued that the grounds listed in the amended law for the exercise of this power do not conform with the constitutionally permissible restrictions on the right to free speech listed by Article 19(2).28 Secondly, these amendments have considerably broadened the scope of activity criminalized by the statute, in particular: sending messages deemed offensive, dishonestly receiving stolen computer resources or communication devices, identity theft, impersonation, violation of bodily privacy, cyberterrorism, the publication or transmission of sexually explicit material, and child pornography.29 Finally, the amendment strengthens the immunity of network intermediaries (a category that can be roughly held to cover both ISPs and online service providers) from prosecution for offences under the statute, although to a lesser extent than the wide safe harbour rule that was originally intended to be introduced.30 This immunity to network intermediaries was created in response to the high profile prosecution of the CEO of Bazee.com (now eBay India) by the Delhi Police for a controversial sexually explicit video clip uploaded via the service. On appeal, the Delhi High Court upheld its ruling (released before the ITA Amendment Bill was passed) that a case could in fact be made for intermediary liability for obscene content under the statute.31 The substantive trial in the case is yet to be completed, however. The amended position in the ITA vis-à-vis the exemption of intermediaries from liability removes the burden of proof from intermediaries.32 It is important to note that this amendment necessitates not only that service providers act when informed about their involvement in unlawful acts by state agencies, but that they must also observe guidelines that the central government might prescribe as to the due diligence they have to discharge.33 These guidelines have not yet been publicly framed or notified. Overall, there seem to be few regular prosecutions under this statute, with 2006–2007 figures showing 99 cases registered with police units regarding the transmission of obscene content, and two cases regarding the failure of parties to comply with decryption as per the pre-amendment statute.34

The regulations found in the ITA may oblige companies to give up the names of individual users to demonstrate their own innocence and a company is presumed responsible for the content posted on the websites it hosts unless it can prove that it was not aware of the content posted by an individual user.35 As a result, internet bloggers have individually experienced prosecution by Indian authorities for online postings. In May 2008, two men were arrested and charged under both the Indian Penal Code and the Information Technology Act for posting derogatory comments about Congress chief Sonia Gandhi on a community on the social networking site Orkut. While the text was posted on a community entitled “I hate Sonia Gandhi”, the person who formed the community did not face charges as voicing a personal dislike is protected in India under freedom of choice.36 Google, owners of Orkut, accommodated the authorities’ request for the poster’s identity.37 Authorities have subsequently ordered Google to disclose additional bloggers’ personal information for other court cases in India, including defamation suits.38

The exact shape and extent of surveillance of both internet communication and mobile-phone networks in India is currently unclear. Wire intercepts of telephone conversations are allowed under the guidelines prescribed by the Supreme Court,39 and their admissibility as evidence in a court of law is not constrained by the legality of the process in which such evidence was procured.40 The extent and level of sophistication of state surveillance of internet communication in India is unknown, though anecdotal accounts indicate that the government’s Intelligence Bureau began using a keyword-based interception system in addition to targeted-IP address interception as far back as 2001.41 There is no requirement for prior judicial approval before intercepting communication either under the Telegraph Act or the ITA, and the post-amendment ITA grants both central and state governments the power to issue directions for the interception, monitoring, or decryption of computer information, while leaving the prescription of procedure and safeguards for the exercise of such powers to the government itself.42 It also grants the central government the power to mandate the preservation and retention by intermediaries of such information, and makes the contravention of such orders an offence.43 The monitoring and collection of traffic data by a government agency for the purposes of enhancing cybersecurity and network protection is also a power vested in the central government to exercise according to the amended statute.44

Cybercafes are regulated across most Indian states; the exact extent and manner of regulation varies according to the policies of the different state police forces concerned, but largely focus on the elimination of anonymous access by mandating the recording of certain basic user details in registers as a minimum requirement.45 Some cybercafes may request a passport photo for their records or demand specific reasons for visiting cybercafes outside their localities.46 With respect to mobile phones, the Department of Telecommunications has instructed operators to only issue and activate mobile SIM cards after users register their personal details with these companies; the rationale being that this helps ensure national security by preventing terrorists from easily securing anonymous access to SIM cards.47 This system has been in place for some time, but became the subject of increased emphasis and oversight after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, with the central government not only castigating mobile operators on their implementation of the verification process, but also reportedly asking them to disconnect all handsets that do not have international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) numbers.48

There have been past incidents involving service attacks and the hacking of websites by nonstate actors during incidents of cross-border tension with Pakistan and China,49 particularly between 1998 and 2002, and during 2008.50 Thus far, however, online journalists and bloggers have not been victims of physical attacks.


1 See Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering 287 (Ronald Deibert et al eds. 2008) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Open Net Initiative - Access Denied: India Profile’], and Cellular Operators Association of India, History of Cellular Telephony in India, at http://www.coai.com/historyIndia.php.

2 See Vikram Raghavan, Communications Law in India 472-473 (2007)

3 C.P. Chandrashekhar, India is Online but Most Indians are Not, Macroscan, (September 26th, 2006), http://www.macroscan.org/the/services/sep06/ser260906India_Online.htm

5 IAMAI & IMRB, I-Cube 2008: Internet in India – Summary Report, at http://www.iamai.in/Upload/Research/I-Cube_2008_Summary_Report_30.pdf, accessed December 2008

6 Id.

7 See IAMAI & IMRB, supra note 4

8 IAMAI & IMRB, Vernacular Content Market in India Report, at http://www.iamai.in/Upload/Research/Vernacular%20Content%20Report_29.pdf, accessed December 2008

10 “India, 4 new mobile phone subscribers every second,” Textually.org, October 22, 2008, http://www.textually.org/textually/archives/2008/10/021533.htm, accessed December 2008

11 See Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, TRAI Annual Report for 2006-07 63 (available at http://www.trai.gov.in/annualreport/AReport2006-07English.pdf)

12 See Google's social networking site in trouble, The Times of India (2006), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2136970.cms, accessed December 2008 and Amit Varma, Orkut and censorship in India, India Uncut (2007), http://indiauncut.com/iublog/article/orkut-and-censorship-in-india/, accessed March 30, 2000. See also Open Net Initiative - Access Denied: India Profile, at 289-291

13 See PIL asking Google to remove India from Google Earth, pluGGd.in (2008), http://www.pluggd.in/india-internet/pil-asking-google-to-remove-india-from-google-earth-3305/, accessed March 30, 2009, and Rhys Blakely, Indian court asked to ban Google Earth, Times Online (2008), http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article5314085.ece, accessed March 30, 2009. See also J.Mohanraj vs The Secretary to Government (Home), Madras High Court Writ Petition No.29713 of 2008, decided on 17 December, 2008 (available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1191397/) (holding that the Madras High Court could not grant a public interest litigation plea to ban Google Earth).

14 Times Online, “Citizen journalists told to stop using Twitter to update on Bombay attacks,” November 27, 2008, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article5245059.ece, accessed March 30, 2009

15 See Open Net Initiative - Access Denied: India Profile, at 290. See also Sandeep Dikshit, Bid to block anti-India website affects users, The Hindu (2003), http://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/23/stories/2003092312761100.htm, accessed March 30, 2009, and Editorial Opinion, Censorship of Internet, The Hindu, (2003), http://www.thehindu.com/2003/10/21/stories/2003102101231000.htm, accessed March 30, 2009. Shivam Vij, Blog blockade will be lifted in 48 hours, Rediff News (2006), http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jul/19blogs.htm, and Shivam Vij, Possible action against ISPs for blocking sites, Rediff News (2006), http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jul/20dot.htm.

16 Blackberry spurns Indian spy call, BBC, May 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7420911.stm, accessed March 30, 2009. See also Press Trust of India, India backs DoT on Blackberry; asks RIM to cooperate, The Times of India, (May 11 2008), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Business/India_Business/India_backs_DoT_on_BlackBerry_asks_RIM_to_cooperate/articleshow/3030151.cms, and Ketan Tanna, Outsmarting Big Brother, The Times of India, (June 8 2008), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Sunday_Specials/Outsmarting_Big_Brother/articleshow/3110252.cms.

17 See Farzad Damania, The Internet: Equalizer of Freedom of Speech? A Discussion on Freedom of Speech on the Internet in the United States and India, 12 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 243, 259 (2002).

18 See Open Net Initiative - Access Denied: India Profile, at 290. See also Raman Jit Singh Chima, The Regulation of the Internet with relation to Speech and Expression by the Indian State 32-36, 53-54(April 25, 2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1237262.

19 See Open Net Initiative - Access Denied: India Profile, at 288-289. See also Chima, supra note 16, at 55-58.

20 Id.

21 Indrajit Basu, Security and Censorship: India to Clip the Wings of Internet, GovTech (2007), http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/103332, accessed March 30, 2009.

22 Frederick Noronha, Blogging: Can ICTs Really Make Free Speech a Reality in India?, Indiablogs, (February 02, 2006), http://indiaweblogs.blogspot.com/2006/02/blogging-can-icts-really-make-free.html, accessed March 30, 2009. See also Blogging India: A Windows Live Report (Press release with summary of findings available at http://download.microsoft.com/download/d/3/b/d3b7d5c9-6005-434c-8e71-822678b15eac/pr_271106.doc).

23 See Claudine Beaumont, Mumbai attacks: Twitter and Flickr used to break news, Telegraph.co.uk, November 27, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/3530640/Mumbai-attacks-Twitter-and-Flickr-used-to-break-news-Bombay-India.html, accessed March 30, 2009; and Rachel Dixon, 2008’s Top 10 Moments in User-Generated News: Mumbai Attacks, NowPublic, (December 15, 2008), http://www.nowpublic.com/tech-biz/1-mumbai-attacks-2008-review, accessed March 30, 2009. See also Pramod K. Nayar, India goes to the blogs: Cyberspace, identity, community, in Popular Culture in a Globalised India 207 (2009), and http://blog.blanknoise.org/

24 Global Voices Online, “A Turbulent Year for South Asia,” December 27, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/12/27/2008-a-turbulent-year-for-south-asia/, accessed March 30, 2009

25 Id.

26 Archana Tyagi et al, Report of the Committee Appointed by the Bombay High Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 1611 of 2001 to Recommend Measures to Protect and Shield Minors from Pornographic and Obscene Material on the Internet 1 (2002), available at http://www.cyquator.com/html/vol1.pdf, and Ajay Goswami v. Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 143

27 PUCL v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301. See also Raghavan, supra note 2, at 760-761

28 See Section 69A of the amended Information Technology Act, and Chima, supra note 16, at 32-36

29 See Sections 66A, 66B, 66C, 66D, 66E, 66F, 67A, and 67B of the amended Information Technology Act

30 Information Technology Amendment Bill, 2008 (available at http://164.100.24.219/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/PassedLoksabha/96-c%20of%202006.pdf). A summary of the previous version on the amendment bill is available at http://www.prsindia.org/docs/bills/1192012012/1192012012_96_2006.pdf and the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee whose comments seem to be the reason why the amendment was changed is available at http://164.100.24.207/committeereports/Information%20Technology/REPORT-I.T.-50E.pdf

31 Avnish Bajaj. v. State, Delhi High Court, decided on May 29th, 2008 (available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/309722/)

32 Section 79 of the amended Information Technology Act

33 Id.

34 National Crimes Record Bureau, Crime in India Table 18.4 (2008) (available at http://ncrb.nic.in/cii2007/cii-2007/Table%2018.4.pdf)

35 “Bombay High Court: orders Google's subsidiary to reveal identity of blogger after posting critical comments,” IFEX, August 26, 2008, http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/96437, accessed March 30, 2009

36 The Times of India, “One Held for Posting Obscene Orkut Message on Sonia,” May 19, 2008

37 Global Voices Online, “Google Assists Police in Orkut User’s Arrest,” May 22, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/05/22/india-google-assists-police-in-orkut-users-arrest/, accessed March 30, 2009

38 “Google ordered to reveal blogger’s identity,” August 15, 2008, http://committeetoprotectbloggers.org/2008/08/15/google-ordered-to-reveal-bloggers-identity/, accessed March 30, 2009

39 Supra note 23.

40 See State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu 2005(11) SCC 600

41 Siddarth Srivastava, India: E-mail users beware, Big Brother is watching, The Times of India, (December 24, 2001), http://www.blythe.org/nytransfer-subs/Covert_Actions/India:_E-mail_users_beware,_Big_Brother_is_watching, accessed March 30, 2009

42 Section 69(1) of the amended Information Technology Act

43 Section 67(C) of the amended Information Technology Act

44 Section 69B of the amended Information Technology Act

45 See Chima, supra note16, at 37-41

46 The Times of India, “ID proof must for cyber café users,” August 18, 2008

47 Special Correspondent, Centre to enforce SIM card verification process by cell phone operators, The Hindu, (December 26, 2008), http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/26/stories/2008122655831200.htm, accessed March 30, 2009

48 Rashmi Pratap, DoT asks cellcos to cut off handsets without IMEI code, The Economic Times, December 19, 2008, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/News_By_Industry/Telecom/DoT_asks_cellcos_to_cut_off_handsets_without_IMEI_code/rssarticleshow/3859301.cms, accessed March 30, 2009

49 See Reporters Without Borders, Internet Under Surveillance 2004 – India, at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10750&Valider=OK, accessed March 30, 2009

50 Aasis Vinayak, The other Indo-Pak war, Sify News (January 12, 2009), http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14835651, accessed March 30, 2009


Posted by at No comments:

Cuba IGIF 2009


Freedom House Freedom on the Net




Cuba


Population: 11.2 million

Internet Users/Penetration 2006: 190 thousand / 2 percent

Internet Users/Penetration 2008: 1.3 million / 11 percent (Note: includes users with access only to intranet)

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2006: 152 thousand

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2008: 327 thousand

Freedom of the Press (2008) Score/Status: 94 / Not Free

Digital Opportunity Index (2006) Ranking: 129 out of 181

GNI Per Capita (PPP): Unavailable

Web 2.0 Applications Blocked: Yes

Political Content Systematically Filtered: No

Bloggers/Online Journalists Arrested: Yes















Status: Not Free


Obstacles to Access: 25 (0–25)

Limits on Content: 32 (0–35)

Violations of User Rights: 33 (0–40)

Total Score: 90 (0–100)





Introduction


Despite the slight loosening of restrictions on the sale of computer and mobile-phone equipment in 2008, Cuba remains one of the world’s most repressive environments for the internet and information and communication technologies (ICTs). There is almost no access to internet applications other than e-mail, and surveillance is extensive. Nevertheless, a nascent community of bloggers has emerged on the island, creatively using online and offline means to express opinions and circulate information about Cuban society.

Cuba was connected to the internet for the first time in 1997, and the National Center for Automated Interchange of Information (CENIAI), the country’s first internet service provider (ISP), was established that year. However, the executive authorities continue to control the legal and institutional structures that decide who has access to the internet and how much access will be permitted.1


Obstacles to Access


Though the government has claimed that all Cubans have access to the internet, according to the ITU, only 1.3 million people – 11.5 percent – had access to the internet in 2008. 2 However, it should be noted that this number is also potentially over inflated as it includes those who had access to the Cuban intranet only, but not to the global internet. A closer estimate is that 240,000 – 2.1 percent – of the population had some level of access to the world wide web in 2008.3 Restrictions on access have been exacerbated by tight government control over related equipment. The sale of modems was banned in 2001, and the sale of computers and computer accessories to the public was banned in 2002. Exceptions could be authorized by the Ministry of Internal Commerce if the items in question were deemed to be “indispensable.” This policy changed in early 2008, when the government of President Raul Castro began allowing Cubans to buy personal computers. Individuals can now legally purchase a computer and connect to an ISP with a government permit. Nonetheless, high costs put both the internet and mobile phones beyond the reach of most of the population. A simple computer with a monitor averages around 722 convertible pesos (US$780) in retail stores, or at least 550 convertible pesos (US$600) on the black market.4 By comparison, the average monthly Cuban salary is approximately 16 convertible pesos (US$17).5 These computers are generally distributed by the state-run Copextel Corporation, which imports communications, computing, and other ICT equipment. An internet connection costs between 6 and 12 convertible pesos (US$9 and US$15) per hour.

According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Cuba had a mobile-phone penetration rate of only 2.9 percent (approximately 327,000 users) as of 2007. However, the government eased restrictions on mobile-phone purchases in March 2008, and reduced the sign-up fee by half, though it still represents three months of wages for the average worker. It is estimated that Cubans signed some 7,400 new contracts for mobile phones in the 10 days following the lifting of the ban, and according to the state-run newspaper Juventud Rebelde, an estimated 480,000 cellular lines were in use by year’s end.6 ETECSA, the state-controlled telecommunications company, predicts that there will be 1.4 million new mobile contracts over the next five years.7 Mobile phones do not include internet connections, but it is possible to send and receive international text messages with certain phones.

TTT he government divides access to web technology between the national intranet and the global internet; most Cubans only have access to the former, which consists of a national e-mail system, a Cuban encyclopedia, a pool of educational materials and open-access journals, Cuban websites, and foreign websites that are supportive of the Cuban government.8 Cubans can legally access the internet only through government-approved institutions, such as the approximately 600 Joven Clubs de La Computacion (Youth Computation Clubs) and points of access run by ETECSA; users are generally required to present identification to use computers at these sites.9 Many neighborhoods in the main cities of Havana and Santiago advertise “internet” access in ETECSA kiosks, but field research has found that the kiosks often lack computers. Instead they have public phones for local and international calls with prepaid phone cards. The government also claims that all schools have computer laboratories; in practice, however, internet access is usually prohibited for students or limited to e-mail and supervised activities on the national intranet.

Individuals who do access the internet face paralyzingly slow connections, and tests conducted on the island found that just two e-mails could be sent per hour using Yahoo! mail. Multimedia applications were inoperable. This was the case even at universities, where the connections are slightly better than at ETECSA access points.10 One segment of the population that enjoys approved access to the internet is the professional class of doctors, professors, and government officials. For example, 3,000 e-mail accounts had been issued to medical institutions by 2001, and facilities like hospitals, polyclinics, research institutions, and local doctors’ offices are linked via an online network called Infomed.11 However, even these users are typically restricted to e-mails and sites related to their activities. Beginning in 2007, the government systematically blocked core internet portal sites such as Yahoo!, MSN, and Hotmail. This ban was extended to blog platforms and blog commentary technology during certain periods in 2008. As a result, Cubans cannot access blogs written by their fellow citizens. Moreover, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) remains blocked in Cuba, with the exception of illegal points of connection in old Havana. Some social-networking platforms such as Facebook are accessible in university cybercafes.

There are only two ISPs, CENIAI Internet and ETECSA, and both are owned by the state. Cubacel, a subsidiary of ETECSA, is the only mobile-phone carrier. In 2000, the Ministry of Information Science and Communication was created to serve as the regulatory authority for the internet, and its Cuban Supervision and Control Agency oversees the development of internet-related technologies.12 In May 2008, Deputy Minister for Information Science and Communication Boris Moreno said “Cuba is not concerned with the individual connection of its citizens to the internet. We use the internet to defend the Revolution and the principles we believe in and have defended all these years.”13 The government argues that access restrictions are a direct consequence of the U.S. embargo, which prevents Cuba from connecting to underwater cables and forces it to use expensive Chinese and Venezuelan satellites instead.14 It has been estimated that the cost of laying a fiber-optic cable from Havana to Florida, to allow high-speed connectivity, would cost as little as $500,000.15 In the meantime, Cuba and Venezuela signed documents in 2006 for the purpose of building and operating a fiber-optic cable linking Cuba and Venezuela (as well as Jamaica, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago) and amplifying Cuba’s internet connections by 2010.16 It remains unclear whether the Cuban government will truly allow widespread access once the infrastructural impediments are removed.


Limits on Content


Rather than engaging in the technically sophisticated blocking and filtering used by other repressive regimes such as China and Tunisia, Cuban authorities rely heavily on lack of technology and prohibitive costs to limit users’ access to information. The websites of foreign news outlets—including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Le Monde, and the Nuevo Herald (a Miami-based Spanish-language daily)—and human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch remain largely accessible, though slow connection speeds impede access to the content on these sites.17 Sites and writings that are considered anti-Cuban or counterrevolutionary are restricted. These include many of the Cuban dissident sites based in the United States and abroad, and any documents containing criticism of the current system or mentioning dissidents, supply shortages, and other politically sensitive issues.18 Blogs written by Cubans residing in Cuba are also inaccessible. For example, sites such as cubanet.org, payolibre.com, bitacoracubana.com, cubadebate.com, and prolibertadprensa.blogspot.com cannot be accessed at the youth computer centers. It is a crime to contribute to international media that are not supportive of the government, a fact that has led to widespread self-censorship. Cuban blogs typically feature implicit or explicit elements of self-censorship and anonymity. Many of those working closely with ICTs are journalists who have been barred from official employment, and the prohibitive costs surrounding the technology represent a major obstacle for them. The majority of their work is done offline by hand, typewriter, or computer, then uploaded and published once or twice a week using a paid internet access card. For those contributing to international outlets, content can be dictated via costly international phone calls.

Despite all of these barriers, Cubans still connect to the internet through both legal and illegal points of access. Some are able to break through the infrastructural blockages by building their own antennas, using illegal dial-up connections, and developing blogs on foreign platforms. The underground economy of internet access also includes account sharing, in which authorized users sell access to those without an official account for one or two convertible pesos per hour. Some foreign embassies allow Cubans to use their facilities, but a number of people who have visited embassies for this purpose have reported police harassment. To date there have been no reported cases of Cuban activists using mobile phones or SMS (text messaging) to organize events or disseminate political information. However, there is a thriving improvisational system of “sneakernets,” in which USB keys, CDs, and DVDs are used to distribute material (articles, satirical cartoons, video clips) that has been downloaded from the internet.

The lack of a proper internet connection remains Cuban bloggers’ biggest challenge, according to Roger Trabas, cofounder of the Bloggers Cuba website. In September 2008, Trabas organized the first meeting—dubbed Blogging on Our Own—designed to bring together the island’s bloggers and those involved in online journalism.19 There is no exact count of blogs produced in Cuba, but the Cuban Journalists’ Union (UPEC) has reported a current total of 174. Examples include Yoani Sanchez’s famous blog Generación Y, which draws 26 percent of its readers from within Cuba, as well as sites like Retazos, Nueva Prensa, PayoLibre.com, Cubaencuentro.com, and Convivencia. Regional radio stations and magazines are also creating online versions, though these outlets are state-run and do not accept contributions from independent journalists. However, in a recent development, some of these sites have installed commentary tools that allow readers to provide feedback and foster discussion.

Cubans succeeded in mobilizing via the intranet in January 2007, following the appearance of Luis Pavon Tamayo on a television program honoring people who have made significant contributions to Cuban culture. Cuban artists and intellectuals spontaneously started an e-mail discussion to protest his appearance. Tamayo had formerly headed the National Culture Council and was widely viewed as responsible for a multiyear crackdown on cultural expression during the 1970s. The period, known as the Grey Five, saw Cuban artists and intellectuals censored, sent to labor camps, or driven into exile. The e-mail protest quickly drew the attention of the government, and Culture Minister Abel Prieto met with 20 of those involved to discuss their concerns.20 Prieto initially refused to apologize for Tamayo’s appearance, but in the face of a growing online movement he reconsidered and issued an apology. He said the appearance—as well as the subsequent appearances of two other leading figures in the 1970s crackdown, Armando Quesada and Jorge Serguera—had been an “error,” and explained that “today the leadership of this country regards that period—which was fortunately brief—with great disapproval.”21




Violations of Users’ Rights


The legal structure in Cuba is not favorable to internet freedom. There is no clear constitutional guarantee of internet freedom, and the constitution explicitly subordinates freedom of speech to the objectives of socialist society.22 Freedom of cultural expression is guaranteed only if the expression is not contrary to the Revolution.23 The penal code and Law 88 set penalties ranging from a few months to 20 years in prison for any activities that are considered a “potential risk,” “disturbing the peace,” a “precriminal danger to society,” “counterrevolutionary,” or “against the national independence or economy.”24

Cuba is one of the few countries to have issued laws and regulations explicitly restricting and outlawing certain online activities. In 1996, the government passed Decree-Law 209, known as Access from the Republic of Cuba to the Global Computer Network, which states that the internet cannot be used “in violation of Cuban society’s moral principles or the country’s laws,” and that e-mail messages must not “jeopardize national security.”25 In 2007, Resolution 127 on network security banned the spreading of information via public data-transmission networks that is against the social interest, norms of good behavior, the integrity of people, or national security. The decree requires access providers to install controls that will enable them to detect and prevent the proscribed activities, and to report them to the relevant authorities.

From a regulatory perspective, Resolution 56/1999 provides that all materials intended for publication or dissemination on the internet must first be approved by the National Registry of Serial Publications. Moreover, Resolution 92/2003 prohibits e-mail and other ICT service providers from granting access to individuals who are not approved by the government, and requires that they enable only domestic chat services, not international ones. Entities that violate these regulations can have their authorization to provide access suspended or revoked.

Despite constitutional provisions that protect various forms of communication, and portions of the penal code that set penalties for the violation of the secrecy of communications, the privacy of users is frequently violated in practice. Tools of content surveillance and control are pervasive, from public access points and universities to government offices. Delivery of e-mail messages is consistently delayed, and it is not unusual for a message to arrive without its attachments. The phenomenon is known to occur in hotel cybercafes used by both tourists and locals.

The new administration of Raul Castro has continued its predecessor’s repressive practices with respect to independent journalism, indirectly affecting the blogging community as well. These practices include the imposition of fines, searches, and the confiscation of money and equipment. There have been a few cases in which online journalists were arrested and punished for their work, most notably the imprisonment of two correspondents of CubaNet. One, Oscar Sanchez Madan, was sentenced to four years in prison in April 2007 for “precriminal social danger,” and the other was sentenced to seven years in November 2005 for “subversive propaganda.”26 Still, bloggers have not been subject to anything akin to the Black Spring of 2003, in which 27 journalists were arrested on grounds that they were “agents of the American enemy.”27

Prominent bloggers do face a wide range of other forms of harassment, intimidation, and restrictions on their rights. Yoani Sanchez and her husband Reynaldo Escobar (a fellow blogger) were summoned for questioning in December 2008, reprimanded, and informed that their right to travel had been restricted, meaning they would be unable to attend a two-day blogging workshop in the western part of the island.28 Other individuals planning to attend the event were also summoned for questioning and pressured to cancel;29 as a result, the meeting of 20 bloggers was reportedly held online to avoid the risk of arrest.30 In May 2008, the government refused to issue Sanchez a travel visa that would have allowed her to receive the Ortega y Gasset prize for digital journalism in Spain.31


1 Ben Corbett, This is Cuba: an outlaw culture survives, Westview Press, 2002,

http://books.google.com/books?id=N2P5n3rU7EkC&pg=PA145&lpg=PA145&dq=CENIAI+Internet&source=bl&ots=33reH-Vvh7&sig=UBxsUT16g0Z2BLKa0P1e5NMRFB0, Accessed March 20, 2009.

2 Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats10.htm#spanish, Accessed March 20, 2009.

3 Reporters Without Borders, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=26096, Accessed March 20, 2009.

4 “Cubans queue for computers as PC ban lifted, but web still outlawed,” Irish Examiner, May 5, 2008.

5 “Mobile phone use booms in Cuba following easing of restrictions,” Agence France-Presse, April 24, 2008.

6 Cellular News, http://www.cellular-news.com/story/35917.php?s=h, Accessed March 18, 2008.

7 “Mobile phone use booms in Cuba following easing of restrictions,” Agence France-Presse, April 24, 2008.

8 ETECSA: Empressa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A., www.enet.cu, Accessed March 20, 2009.

9 Joven Clubs de La Computacion, http://www.cfg.jovenclub.cu/, Accessed March 20, 2009.

10 ETECSA: Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A.

11 Infomed, www.sld.cu, Accessed March 20, 2009.

12 Ministry of Information Science and Communication, http://www.mic.gov.cu/, Accessed March 20, 2009.

13 “In Raul Castro’s reforms in Cuba, internet remains restricted,” Agence-France-Presse, May 17, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gbs2d7rh33vYKZ6hp3xAwhA4BXvQ, Accessed March 20, 2009.

14 For instance, Government sources cite the cost of 4 million US$/yr to connect to the Internet through these satellites. From this, local sources affirm that 850K US$/yr are just to connect a local association of artists and writers.

15 “Cuba to get high-speed Internet in 2010,” Techweb, July 17, 2008

16 Ibid.

17 “Access impeded to Internet platform hosting popular blogs, other websites,” March 31, 2008, http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/92118/,Accessed March 20, 2009.

18 ONI report on Cuba, http://opennet.net/research/profiles/cuba, Accessed March 12, 2009.

19 “Cuba: More Bloggers are Firing Off Thoughts From the Island,” Inter Press Service, October 6, 2008.

20 “Cuban writers angered by resurfacing of censor,” January 16, 2007, http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/cgi-script/csArticles/articles/000051/005155.htm , Accessed March 20, 2009.

21 “Artists’ congress marks more changes in Cuba,” April 5, 2008, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=c97b6387-8824-4198-8910-9cc9b06ac8c6, Accessed March 20, 2009. and Arturo Gracía Hernàndez, “Interview with Abel Prieto, Cuban Minister of Culture,” www.embacu.cubaminrex.cu/Portals/7/Interview.doc , Accessed March 20, 2009.

22 Article 53, available at http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/const_92_e.htm, Accessed March 20, 2009.

23 Article 39, d), available at http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/const_92_e.htm, Accessed March 20, 2009.

24 See – Protection of Cuba’s National Independency and economy. http://cpj.org/reports/2008/03/laws.php

25 Cuba – Telecoms Market Overview & Statistics 2008.

26 Freedom of the Press, Cuba 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008 , Accessed March 12, 2009.

27 Reporters Without Borders, March 16, 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=16771 , Accessed March 20, 2009.

28 “Cuba v. the Bloggers,” PoliBlog, December 6, 2008.

29 Global Voices Online, Cuba Government Officials Tell Bloggers to Cancel Planned Meeting, December 6, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/12/06/cuba-government-officials-tell-bloggers-to-cancel-planned-meeting/ , Accessed March 20, 2009.

31 “Cuba refuses to give blogger visa to collect prize,” Agence France Press, May 6, 2008.


Posted by at No comments:

Russia IGIF 2009


Freedom House Freedom on the Net




Russia


Population: 141.7 million

Internet Users/Penetration 2006: 25.7 million / 18 percent

Internet Users/Penetration 2008: 29.8 million / 21 percent

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2006: 151 million

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2008: 187 million

Freedom of the Press (2008) Score/Status: 78 / Not Free

Digital Opportunity Index (2006) Ranking: 51 out of 181

GNI Per Capita (PPP): $14,400

Web 2.0 Applications Blocked: No

Political Content Systematically Filtered: No

Bloggers/Online Journalists Arrested: Yes















Status: Partly Free


Obstacles to Access: 11 (0–25)

Limits on Content: 17 (0–35)

Violations of User Rights: 23 (0–40)

Total Score: 51 (0–100)





Introduction


Since the internet was first launched in Russia in 1988, the country has made significant gains in the expansion of its information infrastructure. Most Russians access the internet from their homes (71 percent of users) and workplaces (41 percent), whereas only about 6 percent use cybercafés. 1 Internet access via mobile telephones and similar devices has gained popularity since 2006, and 10 percent of users currently report using this method. 2 The web is used primarily to check e-mail and for entertainment purposes, and only secondarily to read news reports and blogs.

After the elimination of independent television channels in 2000–01 and the tightening of press regulations, the internet became the last relatively uncensored platform for public debate and the expression of political opinions. There have not been any significant cases of technical blocking or filtering, but the authorities have increasingly engaged in intentional content removal. Internet freedom has corroded significantly in recent years, and this trend is borne out by the statistics: one internet activist killed, seven criminal cases launched against bloggers, one blogger badly beaten, and ten oppositional blogs attacked by hackers. The legal environment is threatened by a number of new legislative initiatives, and some have even proposed building a massive filtering and censorship apparatus in the mold of China’s infamous “Great Firewall.”


Obstacles to Access


Internet and mobile-phone penetration in Russia continues to grow, and the government largely supports the dissemination of these technologies. The number of internet users jumped from 1.5 million in 1999 to 29.8 million in 2008,3 although this still gives Russia a much lower penetration rate than that in Western Europe, and more than half of Russia’s users are concentrated in the two largest cities.4 Mobile use expanded even more rapidly, rising from a few million subscribers in the late 1990s to 187 million—about 35 million more than the country’s actual population—in 2007.5 The Russian mobile market in 2006 became the third largest in the world by subscribers and revenue, after China and the United States. A massive campaign to connect all Russian schools to the internet began in 2002. While the majority of the schools were connected by the end of 2008, the speed of the link is unacceptably slow at 128 kilobits per second; this connection is shared by a given school’s entire stock of 30 to 60 computers. 6 Although dial-up internet access costs roughly the same across the country, the prices for broadband access in the majority of Russia’s regions are four times higher than in Moscow.7 There are infrastructural limitations to internet access, but the government does not widely block access to the web or to specific web-based applications. The YouTube video-sharing platform, the social-networking site Facebook, and various international blog-hosting services are freely available.

Nearly 75 percent of Russian users still have dial-up. 8 The broadband market, which rose from 3.6 million users in 2006 to 8.3 million in 2008, is relatively liberalized. The state-owned provider SvyazInvest accounts for only 27.8 percent of broadband users, with the rest served by private companies. Many of those are regional companies affiliated with large national firms. As at the federal level, regional ownership usually depends on political connections and the tacit approval of regional authorities. Although this situation is not the direct result of legal or economic obstacles, it nonetheless reflects an element of corruption that is widespread in the telecommunications sector as well as other parts of the Russian economy.

Three leading operators—MTS, Vimpelcom, and MegaFon—hold 85 percent of the mobile-phone market.9 While formally independent, each of these firms has indirect ties to the government. According to independent analyst Vadim Gorshkov, MegaFon is connected with former minister of telecommunications Leonid Reyman, and MTS is linked to the Moscow regional leadership.10 The information and communications technology (ICT) sector is regulated by the Federal Service for the Supervision of Communications and Mass Communications, whose director is appointed by the prime minister. The appointment process is not transparent. Boris Boyarskov, the head of the service for four years until his replacement by a subordinate in December 2008, reportedly served in the KGB during the Soviet era.11 There are no special restrictions on opening cybercafés or starting internet service provider (ISP) businesses, although unfair competition and other such obstacles are not unusual in Russia.


Limits on Content


Legal controls on the internet were first proposed in 1996 by leftist members of parliament, though no action was taken at the time. Since then, however, the authorities have pursued various methods of censorship. In October 2008, a leading information-technology company official, Valentin Makarov, proposed building a Russian version of China’s so-called Great Firewall within the next 10 years.12 Until such a nationwide filtering apparatus is created, website operators and users can evade state interference fairly easily by utilizing foreign hosting services.

There has been only one well documented case of systematic blocking or filtering by ISPs, and it was later downplayed. The website affected, Kompromat.ru, was blocked by several providers in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election.13 After the action became public, and the election was over, the filter was removed. However, the practice of exerting pressure by telephone is quite widespread. It is carried out not only by security agencies but also by Kremlin and regional administration officials, who call owners, shareholders, and anyone else in a position to remove unwanted material and ensure that the problem does not come up again. After receiving such calls, managers and editors are more likely to practice self-censorship. The director of leading hosting company Masterhost, Aleksandr Ovchinnikov, admitted that his company gets about 100 requests daily from the authorities to black out “inconvenient”—usually nationalistic or antigovernment—websites.14 Commenting on the Kompromat case, Ovchinnikov said the order to block the site was made “with a phone call.” A similar practice was used in the case of the website of the newspaper Vyatskii Nablyudatel, which was closed in April 2008 at the request of the Kirov regional police due to a forum comment criticizing the regional leadership. After the incident, the newspaper website moved to a foreign host to protect itself from further government threats.15

There is little evidence of intentional and illegal removal of blog posts. On the Livejournal blogging platform, for instance, posts have been removed only if they violated privacy rights (by including personal address details or other private data) or promoted terrorism. However, illegal content removals do occur. In March 2008, the website islam.boom.ru was closed because the prosecutor’s office said that it was spreading extremism.16 In October 2008, hosting service HostZona.ru closed the website Putin-loh.ru (“Putin is a dumbass”).17 The host’s director explained that the content of the website insulted the prime minister and it was his civic duty to close it down.

When the web was not such a popular phenomenon, the Kremlin was able to exert its influence with rather limited means, for example by forum trolling (in internet slang, a troll is someone who posts controversial, inflammatory, irrelevant, or off-topic messages in an online community) and establishing propaganda websites.18 The so-called Brigade, a pro-Kremlin group formed by paid bloggers and volunteers, is still active, but its influence declined as other users identified its members and began to ban trolls.

The situation started to change after the “color revolutions” in three former Soviet countries in 2003–05, when information technology played a significant role in mobilizing large numbers of people for political protests. In November 2007, Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoruk proposed increasing government control over the internet.19 The ruling United Russia party presented legislation in February 2008 that would require internet sites with over 1,000 visitors per day to register with the authorities, making them equivalent to print media with circulations of 1,000 or more copies, but the measure was not enacted.20 Many Russians view the internet as a proper sphere for governmental control. According to a Levada-Center poll taken in December 2006, some 22 percent would “absolutely agree” and another 22 percent would “rather agree” with the statement “It’s time to bring order to the internet.”21 However, the Kremlin is not unified on the issue. There have been constant tensions between social conservatives who express aspirations to overtly control the internet (the United Russia party, together with the influential “siloviki” faction, the Federal Security Service [FSB], and the prosectutor’s office) and centrists (Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, President Dmitri Medvedev, and current and former ministers of communications Igor Shchegolev and Leonid Reyman) who do not want to damage their international reputations with censorship scandals and prefer more sophisticated tools to control internet content.

Russia’s vibrant blogosphere includes over 3.8 million blogs.22 Approximately 80 percent of Russian-language bloggers live inside the country with the remaining 20 percent living outside in the large Russian diaspora.23 President Medvedev started a video blog in October 2007, and three regional governors followed suit.24 Unfortunately, blogs do not have a major influence on political life. This is due less to the apathy of Russian web users than to the government’s success in preventing online activism from spreading to the streets or reaching wider media audiences. Almost all large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (based in Moscow and Saint Petersburg) have their own websites, but those based in the regions are less likely to have a presence online. Non-Russian-speaking ethnic groups are underrepresented on the web. There is little discussion of the Chechnya issue, as opposed to the leadership of Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov. During the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, the Russian blogosphere, even its liberal elements, generally supported the Russian invasion.

Livejournal is the most popular blogging platform, accounting for 45 to 50 percent of all Russian-language blogs. This may be due to its adoption by a group of the Russian internet elite (Anton Nossik and Yuri Zasurski, among others). Other factors include the site’s “friendship” mechanism and the relative simplicity of the interface.

The Kremlin allegedly started to influence the blogosphere in 1999–2000 through just one organization, the Foundation on Effective Politics, led by Gleb Pavlovski.25 In 2006–08, the Russian internet experienced a proliferation of Kremlin-affiliated “content providers” that were essentially propaganda sites.26 Among the new net-propagandists were Konstantin Rykov and his New Media Stars,27 Vadim Gorshenin of Pravda.ru,28 and Aleksey Chesnakov of the Center for Political Conjuncture Research. Each of these media managers, according to prominent journalist Oleg Kashin, has a liaison on the president’s staff. The emergence of competing propagandist websites led to the establishment of a vast network of online propaganda that collectively dominates search results, among other effects.29

If an opposition or grassroots organization starts its own internet platform, Kremlin-related groups will launch several that are similar in form, if not in content. These sites create confusion among users by adopting similar imagery, slogans, and names. Meanwhile, bloggers who report on regional protests or some other sensitive incident are swamped by other blogs that give an opposite account, sometimes using sophisticated language but also resorting to obscenity to discourage debate.

The topics targeted with such tactics vary from region to region but often include political opposition, dissidents like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, murdered journalists, jobs and working conditions, and cases of international conflict or rivalry (with countries such as Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, but also over U.S. and European foreign policies). The issue of spontaneous protests triggered by the economic crisis appears to be a growing concern.

The most successful civic action coordinated with the help of online forums and blogs was the movement against the restriction of right-hand-drive automobiles, which are imported from Japan and used widely in the Far East. Beginning in 2005, the organization Freedom of Choice (Svoboda Vybora) used forums to organize political action in different cities in Siberia.30 In addition to thwarting government attempts to discontinue the use of right-hand-drive cars, the group has taken up other issues important to motorists, including road quality, taxes, insurance rates, and special driving rules for senior government officials.

There is little information on the use of SMS, or text messaging, in political agitation. However, presidential staff used SMS in mobilizing people to participate in national elections in 2007.31 The same practice was used in several regional election campaigns.32 Certain mobile operators like Vimpelcom have stated that they prohibit political agitation through SMS. The use of political SMS messages is linked to other problems, including loose laws on commercial advertisements via SMS.33

As social-networking sites and blogger platforms have grown in importance, they have caught the attention not only of the Russian government but also of Russian business magnates, or oligarchs. Since they are eager to maintain good relations with the Kremlin, oligarchs are likely to resort to various nontransparent practices to ensure that their web services are free of objectionable material or activity. In December 2007, a day after the parliamentary elections, Livejournal was bought by the oligarch Aleksandr Mamut.34 Some journalists accused the new owners of leaking “closed” and “friends-only” entries to the police and the FSB. In December 2007, the creator of the most popular social-networking site, Odnoklassniki, publicly announced that his service refused to cooperate with the FSB.35 Although the veracity of his statement remains uncertain, it suggests that the FSB has pursued such cooperation. In June 2008, the Kremlin-affiliated oligarch Alisher Usmanov bought a 50 percent stake in Livejournal from Mamut.36 In July, Usmanov announced his purchase of significant stakes in Odnoklassniki and another social-networking site, Vkontakte.37


Violations of Users’ Rights


Since 2006, conditions for user rights in Russia have significantly worsened. Bloggers have become subject not only to hacker attacks but also to physical violence and legal prosecution. Although the constitution grants the right of free speech, there are no special laws protecting online modes of expression, and even constitutional guarantees are routinely violated. Online journalists do not possess the same rights as regular journalists unless they register their websites as mass media. Recent police practice has been to target online expression using Article 282 of the criminal code, which restricts extremism. The term is vaguely defined and includes xenophobia and incitement of hatred toward a social group.

Following the 2007 parliamentary elections, the government launched at least seven criminal cases against blog and forum writers. In the best-known case, 23-year-old blogger Savva Terentyev was convicted in July 2008 of denigrating the human dignity of a social group—the police—and sentenced to one year of probation.

The government’s technical capabilities in monitoring online activity have risen drastically in recent years. Since 2000, all ISPs have been obliged to install the “system for operational investigative measures,”38 or SORM-2, which gives the FSB and police access to internet traffic. The system is analogous to the Carnivore/DCS1000 software implemented by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and operates as a packet-sniffer which can analyze and log data passing over a digital network.39 However, no known cases of SORM-2 use have been reported. Legislation approved in April 2007 allows government services to intercept data traffic without a warrant,40 and in August 2008, the FSB announced the creation of a new portal to monitor the Russian internet and mass media. Little detailed information has been released on how the portal works, although the main aim of the project is the monitoring of public opinion.

Hacker attacks on opposition bloggers became a mass phenomenon in the summer of 2007, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. Ten popular bloggers were targeted by a group of hackers sponsored by Kremlin-affiliated political operatives. The blogs were ravaged and defaced. DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks became another powerful instrument of the Kremlin’s hidden influence. In May 2007, during a major public and diplomatic row with Estonia over the fate of a Soviet war memorial in the Estonian capital, numerous Estonian government and other websites were attacked, and few Kremlin-based internet-protocol addresses were spotted.41 A similar tactic was used during the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, although the Georgian side also used DDoS attacks, combined with ISP filtering of the “.ru” country code.42 During the 2007 electoral campaign, the websites of three parties—the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS),43 Yabloko,44 and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)45—were attacked.

When there are no grounds for a criminal case, physical violence has been used against bloggers and online commentators. Citizen reporter and blogger Grigorii Belonuchkin was beaten after filing a voting-fraud lawsuit against a local electoral commission in April 2008.46 Well-known political activist Magomed Yevloyev, creator of the Ingushetia.ru website, was killed by personal security agents of Murat Zyazikov, the president of the Russian republic of Ingushetia, after being detained at the local airport.47 Zyazikov was dismissed two months later, but no criminal case was launched against him or his security personnel.


2 http://www.gfk.ru/Go/View?id=338, accessed March 20, 2009.

6 Industry experts’ opinion.

7 Based on the comparative research of the ISP prices: http://eburg.nag.ru/, accessed March 20, 2009.

9 “Russian Telecom Sector - Dynamic Growth in 2006,” Ezine @rticles, http://ezinearticles.com/?Russian-Telecom-Sector---Dynamic-Growth-in-2006&id=552086, accessed March 20, 2009.

11 RFERL Newsline, April 21, 2004, http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2004/04-04-21.rferl.html, accessed March 20, 2009 and “Kremlin appears to be rattled by unrest,” St. Petersburg Times, December 16, 2008, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=27850&highlight=boyarskov, accessed March 25, 2009.

13 http://habrahabr.ru/blogs/telecom/20677/, accessed March 20, 2009.

14 http://www.nr2.ru/moskow/169361.html, accessed March 20, 2009.

18 More on that topic here: http://ds.ru/ss1.htm

24 http://blog.kremlin.ru/, accessed March 20, 2009.

25 http://ds.ru/ss1.htm accessed March 27, 2009

27 Rykov’s projects include: vzglyad.ru, Russia.ru, chaskor.ru, litprom.ru; see also: http://avmalgin.livejournal.com/529896.html, accessed March 27, 2009

28 Gorshenin’s projects include: yoki.ru, politonline.ru, electorat.info

30 http://www.19may.ru/, accessed March 20, 2009.

33 http://e-moe.com.ua/node/786, accessed March 20, 2009.

36 http://www.dengi.ua/news/38264.html, accessed March 20, 2009.

37 http://www.kp.ru/online/news/117169/, accessed March 20, 2009.

46 http://www.golos.org/a1376.html, accessed March 20, 2009.


Posted by at No comments:
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)