IGIF - Methodology

Freedom House Freedom on the Net

Freedom on the Net Methodology

This 2009 pilot Freedom on the Net provides analytical reports and numerical ratings for 15 strategic countries. The countries were chosen in order to provide a representative sample with regard to geographical and regional diversity and economic development, as well as varying levels of internet and digital media freedom. The ratings and reports included in this pilot primarily cover events that took place between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2008.

What we measure

The Freedom on the Net index aims to measure each country’s level of internet and digital media freedom on the basis of two key components—access to the relevant technology and the free flow of information through it without fear of repercussions. Given increasing technological convergence, the index measures not only internet freedom, but also access and openness of other digital means of news media transmission, particularly mobile phones and text messaging services.

Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of freedom. The index methodology is grounded in basic standards of free expression, derived in large measure from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

This standard applies to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development.

In measuring digital media freedom, the index is particularly concerned with the transmission and exchange of news and other politically relevant communications, as well as the protection of users’ rights to privacy and freedom from both legal and extralegal repercussions arising from their online activities. At the same time, the index acknowledges that in the some instances freedom of expression and access to information may be legitimately restricted. The standard for such restrictions applied in this index is that they be implemented only in narrowly defined circumstances and in line with international human rights standards, the rule of law, and the principles of necessity, and proportionality. As much as possible, censorship and surveillance policies and procedures should be transparent and include avenues for appeal available to those affected.

The index does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals within each country. While digital media freedom may be primarily affected by state actions, pressures and attacks by nonstate actors, including insurgents and other armed groups, are also considered. Thus, the index ratings generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, including private corporations.

The scoring process

The index aims to capture the entire “enabling environment” for internet freedom within each country through a set of 19 methodology questions, divided into three categories, which are intended to highlight the vast range of issues that can impact digital media freedom. Each individual question is scored on a varying range of points. Assigning numerical points allows for comparative analysis among the countries surveyed and facilitates an examination of trends over time. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) as well as a score for each category. The degree to which conditions in each country enable the free flow of news and information via the internet and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) determines their overall classification as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Countries scoring from 0 to 30 points overall are regarded as having a “Free” internet and digital media environment; 31 to 60, “Partly Free”; and 61 to 100, “Not Free”. An accompanying country report provides narrative detail on the points covered by the methodology questions.

The methodology examines the level of internet and ICT freedom through a set of 19 questions and 90 subquestions, organized into three baskets:

• Obstacles to Access—including governmental efforts to block specific applications or technologies; infrastructural and economic barriers to access; and legal and ownership control over internet and mobile-phone access providers

• Limits on Content—including filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; manipulation of content; the diversity of online news media; and usage of digital media for social and political activism

• Violations of User Rights—including legal protections and restrictions on online activity; surveillance and other privacy violations; and repercussions for online activity, such as prosecution, imprisonment, physical attacks, and other forms of harassment

Index Checklist Questions

• Each country is ranked on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the best and 100 being the worst.

• A combined score of 0–30 is Free, 31–60 is Partly Free, and 61–100 is Not Free.

• Under each question, a lower number of points is allotted for a more free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment.

• Unless otherwise indicated, the subquestions listed are meant to provide guidance as to what issues should be addressed under each methodology question, though not all will apply to every country.

1. Obstacles to Access (0–25 points)

1. Does the government block access to digital media or particular Web 2.0 applications permanently or during specific events? (0–6 points)

• Does the government place limits on the amount of bandwidth that access providers can supply?

• Does the government use control over internet infrastructure (routers, switches, etc.) to limit connectivity?

• Does the government centralize telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate control of content and surveillance?

• Does the government block protocols and tools that allow for instant, person-to-person communication (VOIP, instant messaging, text messaging, etc.), particularly those based outside the country (e.g., Facebook)?

• Does the government block protocols and Web 2.0 applications that allow for information sharing or building online communities (video-sharing, social-networking sites, comment features, blogging platforms, etc.)?

• Is there blocking of certain tools that enable circumvention of online filters and censors?

2. Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to internet and other ICTs? (0–6 points)

• Does poor infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, etc.) limit citizens’ ability to receive internet in their homes and businesses?

• Is there widespread public access to the internet through internet cafés, libraries, or other venues?

• Is there a high degree of internet and mobile-phone penetration?

• Is there a significant difference between internet penetration and access in rural versus urban areas?

• Are broadband services available in addition to dial-up?

3. Is access to the internet and other ICTs prohibitively expensive or beyond reach of certain segments of the population? (0–3 points)

• In command economies, does the state set the price of internet access prohibitively high?

• Do financial constraints, such as high costs of telephone/internet services, make internet access prohibitively expensive for large segments of the population?

• Do low literacy rates (linguistic and “computer literacy”) limit citizens’ ability to use the internet?

• To what extent are online software, news, and other information available in the main local languages spoken in the country?

4. Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that prevent the existence of diverse business entities providing access to digital technologies? (0–6 points)

Note: Each of the following access providers are scored separately:

1a. Internet-service providers (ISPs) and other backbone internet providers (0–2 points)

1b. Cybercafes and other businesses that allow public internet access (0–2 points)

1c. Mobile-phone companies (0–2 points)

• Is there a monopoly in place or do users have a choice among access providers, including some that are privately owned?

• Is it legally possible to establish a private access provider or does the state place extensive legal or regulatory controls over the establishment of providers?

• Are registration requirements for establishing an access provider unduly onerous or are they approved/rejected on partisan or prejudicial grounds?

• Does the state place prohibitively high fees on the establishment and operation of access providers?

5. To what extent do national regulatory bodies overseeing digital technology operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? (0–4 points)

• Are there explicit legal guarantees protecting the independence and autonomy of any regulatory body overseeing internet and other ICTs (exclusively or as part of a broader mandate) from political or commercial interference?

• Is the appointment process transparent and representative of different stakeholders’ interests?

• Are decisions taken by the regulatory body seen to be fair and apolitical and to take meaningful notice of comments from stakeholders in society?

• Are efforts by access providers and other internet-related organizations to establish self-regulatory mechanisms permitted and encouraged?

• Does the allocation of digital resources, such as domain names or IP addresses, on a national level by a government-controlled body create an obstacle to access?

2. Limits on Content (0–35 points)

1. To what extent does the state censor internet and other ICT content, particularly on political and social issues? (0–8 points)

• Is there significant blocking or filtering of internet sites, web pages, blogs, data centers, or text-messaging content, particularly those related to political and social topics?

• Are other procedures—judicial or extralegal—used to order the removal of content from the internet, either prior to or after its publication?

• Are certain contentious issues, such as official corruption, the role of the armed forces or the political opposition, human rights, religion, or foreign news sites systematically targeted for online censorship?

• Do state authorities block or filter information and views from inside the country—particularly concerning human rights abuses, government corruption, and poor standards of living—to prevent them from reaching the outside world, for example by intercepting e-mail, text messages, etc.?

2. To what extent is censorship of internet and ICT content transparent, proportional to the stated aims, and accompanied by an independent appeals process? (0–4 points)

• Are there national laws, independent oversight bodies, and other procedures in place to ensure that decisions to censor content are legitimate and proportional to their stated aim?

• Are state authorities transparent about what content is blocked or filtered (both at the level of public policy and at the moment the censorship occurs)?

• Do state authorities block more types of content than they publicly declare?

• Do independent avenues of appeal exist for those who find content they produced to have been subjected to censorship?

3. Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? (0–4 points)

• Is there widespread self-censorship by online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users in both state-run online media and privately run websites?

• Are there unspoken “rules” that prevent an online journalist or user from expressing certain opinions in ICT communication? 

• Is there avoidance of subjects that can clearly lead to censorship or harm to the author?

4. To what extent is the content of online sources of information determined or subtly manipulated by the government or a particular partisan interest? (0–6 points)

• To what degree do the government or nonstate actors subject online news outlets to editorial direction or pressure?

• Do authorities issue official guidelines or directives on coverage to online media outlets, blogs, etc.?

• Are the funding, ownership, and management of websites transparent?

• Do government officials or other actors bribe or otherwise put economic pressure on online journalists, bloggers, website owners, or service providers in order to influence the online content they produce or host?

• Does the government employ, or require access providers to employ, individuals to post progovernment remarks in online bulletin boards and chat rooms?

5. To what extent are sources of information that are robust and reflect a diversity of viewpoints readily available to citizens, despite government efforts to limit access to certain content? (0–4 points)

• Are people able to access a range of local and international news sources via the internet or text messages, despite efforts to restrict the flow of information?

• Does the public have ready access to media outlets or websites that express independent, balanced views?

• Does the public have ready access to sources of information that represent a range of political and social viewpoints, including those of vulnerable or marginalized groups in society?

• To what extent do users employ proxy servers and other methods to circumvent state censorship efforts?

6. To what extent are individuals able to use the internet and other ICTs as sources of information and tools for mobilization, particularly regarding political and social issues? (0–6 points)

• Are internet sources (news websites, blogs, etc.) a primary medium of news dissemination for a large percentage of the population?

• To what extent does the online community cover political developments and provide scrutiny of government policies, official corruption, or actions by other powerful societal actors?

• To what extent do online media outlets and blogs represent diverse interests within society, for example through websites run by community organizations or religious, ethnic, and other minorities?

• To what extent are online communication or social-networking sites used as a means to organize politically, including for “real-life” activities?

• Are mobile phones and other ICTs used as a medium of news dissemination and political organization, including on otherwise banned topics?

7. Are there economic constraints that negatively impact users’ ability to publish content online or online media outlets’ ability to remain financially sustainable? (0–3 points)

• Is there a high degree of ownership concentration within the online services and advertising industry?

• Are connections with government officials necessary for online media outlets to be economically viable?

• Are users required to pay varying fees for different degrees of access and publication rights (i.e., are there limitations on “net neutrality”)?

• Do users have access to free or low-cost blogging services, web hosts, etc. that allow them to make use of the internet to express their own views?

• Does the state limit the ability of online media to accept advertising or investment, particularly from foreign sources, or does it limit advertisers from conducting business with disfavored online media?

3. Violations of User Rights (0–40 points)

1. To what extent do the constitution and other laws contain provisions designed to protect freedom of expression, including on the internet, and are they enforced? (0–6 points)

• Does the constitution contain language that provides for freedom of speech and of the press generally?

• Are there laws or legal decisions that specifically protect online modes of expression?

• Are online journalists and bloggers accorded the same rights and protections given to print and broadcast journalists?

• Is the judiciary independent and do the Supreme Court, attorney general, and other representatives of the higher judiciary support free expression?

• Is there implicit impunity for private and/or state actors who commit crimes against online journalists, bloggers, or other citizens for their online activities?

2. Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online and ICT activities? (0–4 points)

• Are there specific laws criminalizing online expression and activity such as posting or downloading information, sending an e-mail or text message, etc.? (Note: this excludes legislation addressing harmful content such as child pornography or activities such as malicious hacking.)

• Do laws restrict the type of material that can be communicated in online expression or via text messages, such as communications about ethnic or religious issues, national security, or other sensitive topics?

• Are restrictions of internet freedom narrowly defined, closely circumscribed, and proportional to the legitimate aim?

• Are vaguely worded penal codes or security laws applied to internet-related or ICT activities?

• Are there penalties for libeling officials or the state in online content?

• Can an online outlet based in another country be sued if its content can be accessed from within the country (i.e., do the laws encourage “libel tourism” and similar practices)?

3. Are individuals prosecuted or punished by other legal means for posting or accessing information on the internet or disseminating information via other ICTs, particularly on political and social issues? (0–6 points)

• Are writers, commentators, or bloggers subject to imprisonment or other legal sanction as a result of posting material on the internet?

• Are citizens subject to imprisonment, civil liability, or other legal sanction as a result of accessing or downloading material from the internet or for transmitting information via e-mail or text messages?

• Does the lack of an independent judiciary hinder fair proceedings in ICT-related cases?

• Are penalties for “irresponsible journalism” or “rumor mongering” applied widely?

• Are online journalists, bloggers, or others regularly prosecuted, jailed, or fined for libel or defamation (including in cases of “libel tourism”)?

4. Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or require user registration? (0–4 points)

• Are website owners, bloggers, or users in general required to register with the government?

• Are users able to post comments online or purchase mobile phones anonymously, or must they use their real names or register with the government?

• Are users prohibited from using encryption software to protect their communications?

• Are there laws restricting the use of encryption and other security tools, or requiring that the government be given access to encryption keys and algorithms?

• Can the government obtain information about users without legal process?

5. To what extent is there state surveillance of internet and ICT activities without judicial or other independent oversight, including systematic retention of user traffic data? (0–6 points)

• Do the authorities regularly monitor websites, blogs, and chat rooms, or the content of e-mail and text messages?

• Where the judiciary is independent, are there procedures in place for judicial oversight of surveillance, and to what extent are these followed?

• Where the judiciary lacks independence, is there another independent oversight body in place to guard against abusive use of surveillance technology, and to what extent is it able to carry out its responsibilities without government interference?

• Is content intercepted during internet surveillance admissible in court?

6. To what extent are providers of access to digital technologies required to aid the government in controlling and monitoring the access of their users? (0–6 points)

Note: Each of the following access providers are scored separately:

1a. Internet-service providers (ISPs) and other backbone internet providers (0–2 points)

1b. Cybercafes and other businesses that allow public internet access (0–2 points)

1c. Mobile-phone companies (0–2 points)

• Are access providers legally responsible for the content transmitted via the technology they supply, and are they prosecuted for opinions expressed by third parties via such technology?

• Are access providers legally required to filter the content accessed or transmitted by their users?

• Are access providers required to monitor their users and supply information about their digital activities to the government (through either technical interception or manual monitoring, such as user registration in cybercafes)?

• Are access providers prosecuted for not doing so?

• Does the state attempt to control access providers through less formal methods, such as codes of conduct?

7. Are bloggers, other ICT users, websites, or service providers subject to extralegal intimidation, physical violence, or technical attacks by state authorities or any other actor? (0–8 points)

• Are individuals subject to murder, injury, harassment, threats, abduction, expulsion, arbitrary detention, or torture as a result of online activities, including membership in certain online communities?

• Do armed militias, organized crime elements, insurgent groups, political or religious extremists, or other organizations regularly target online commentators?

• Have online journalists, bloggers, or others fled the country or gone into hiding to avoid such action?

• Are websites or blogs subject to targeted “technical violence,” such as service attacks, hacking, etc., as a result of their content?

• Have cybercafes or property of online commentators been targets of physical attacks or the confiscation or destruction of property?

Brazil IGIF 2009

Freedom House Freedom on the Net

Brazil

Population: 194 million

Internet Users/Penetration 2006: 32 million / 17 percent

Internet Users/Penetration 2008: 68 million / 35 percent

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2006: 100 million

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2008: 151 million

Freedom of the Press (2008) Score/Status: 42 / Partly Free

Digital Opportunity Index (2006) Ranking: 65 out of 181

GNI Per Capita (PPP): $9,400

Web 2.0 Applications Blocked: Yes

Political Content Systematically Filtered: No

Bloggers/Online Journalists Arrested: No

Status: Free

Obstacles to Access: 5 (0–25)

Limits on Content: 8 (0–35)

Violations of User Rights: 13 (0–40)

Total Score: 26 (0–100)

Introduction

For a country with large social disparities, Brazil has made significant gains in expanding internet access and mobile-phone usage in recent years. It is home to the largest population of internet users in Latin America and the seventh largest in the world.¹ The country first connected to the internet in 1990,² and connectivity is now available in most areas through a variety of technologies, though some infrastructural limitations remain. While internet use has been mostly unrestricted in the past, several legal actions threatened free online expression in 2007 and 2008, including court decisions leading to censorship of reporting that was critical of politicians, a ban on political campaigning on the Orkut social-networking platform, and proposed cybercrime legislation.

Obstacles to Access

According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Brazil had 68 million internet users as of December 2008, accounting for 35.2 percent of the population. A lack of infrastructure affects large segments of users, mainly in rural areas, and is the primary barrier to internet connectivity. Nevertheless, great improvements have been made in recent years as the government has initiated dozens of programs to connect the population to the internet, including investment in WiMax Networks and Digital Cities projects.³ Many of these projects employ broadband technology, which is accessible to a majority of users. The internet is used by people at various socio-economic levels,⁴ and the country’s e-commerce, e-government, and online-banking services are among the most developed in the world.⁵ However, due to persistent poverty, internet access remains out of reach for large portions of the population.

Six companies share the majority of the mobile-phone market, and penetration is increasing rapidly. Statistics show an average annual increase of 20 percent over the last five years and approximately 151 million mobile phones as of November 2008.⁶

While there have been no major cases of internet blocking by the executive branch, there were several incidents during the coverage period in which the judiciary interfered with access to certain online applications. In 2007, a judge ordered the removal of a video clip showing the private acts of a model and her boyfriend after the woman sued the YouTube video-sharing site.⁷ YouTube attempted to comply, but users constantly reposted the offending video. The judge then requested that Brazilian internet service providers (ISPs) block the entire site. As a result, YouTube was inaccessible in Brazil for several days in January 2007. The decision was eventually reversed.⁸

Though they are generally accessible, Google’s social-networking site Orkut and the blog service Wordpress have also been temporarily blocked following orders by the Brazilian judiciary and police. Such incidents have arisen in cases related to pedophilia, hate speech, and racist, homophobic, or defamatory material. Brazilian ISPs apparently lack the technical knowledge or software needed to block a single URL and are therefore forced to limit access to an entire site to comply with government requests. In some cases, however, alternative agreements have been reached between the judiciary and ISP companies to restrict access to the content in question.⁹

Despite an intricate regulatory environment, there are no specific legal or economic obstacles preventing the operation of diverse businesses that provide access to digital technologies. As a consequence of privatization plans implemented in the 1990s, however, the telecommunications market in general, and the ISP market in particular, tend toward concentration. More than 1,000 ISPs now operate in the country, according to the Brazilian Association of ISPs (ABRANET). However, the four largest companies—Terra, UOL, IG, and Yahoo!—hold more than 50 percent of the market. Broadband access is increasing as prices fall,¹⁰ but it is also concentrated among telecommunications and cable companies.¹¹

The telecommunications regulatory body, ANATEL, and the antitrust body, CADE, work to ensure that information and communication technologies (ICTs) operate in a free, fair, and independent manner, under the rule of law. These federal bodies have an interagency cooperation agreement defining concurrent competencies, and CADE is authorized by the General Telecommunications Law to have the final word when dealing with antitrust issues, such as market concentration and price setting.¹² In a pioneering initiative, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), a multi-stakeholder organization, was created in 1995 to guarantee transparency and social participation in issues related to internet governance.¹³ Representatives from the government, the private sector, academia, and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community sit as members, with the latter chosen since 2004 in relatively democratic and open elections.

Limits on Content

The government does not employ any technical methods to filter or otherwise limit access to online content. Nonetheless, legal action by the judiciary and government officials has emerged in recent years as a barrier to free speech and a means of removing content that is deemed undesirable. In December 2007, a court in the southern city of Porto Alegre forced journalist Vitor Vieira to withdraw content from an internet site that implicated a state representative.¹⁴ In October 2008, an injunction was ordered against the Folha Online website, requiring it to remove a corruption-related report on Workers’ Party candidate Luiz Marinho’s alleged visit to a nightclub on automaker Volkswagen’s tab.¹⁵ In another incident in 2008, the opposition online journal NovoJornal, known for its criticism of Minas Gerais state governor Aecio Neves, was taken down by the authorities. They cited charges of posting anonymously, contrary to constitutional provisions that forbid anonymity; however, the website’s director had reportedly registered the publication under his name as required by law.¹⁶

In a move that was seen as having a negative impact on the democratic process, restrictions were placed on the use of online applications for political campaigning during the 2008 elections. Resolution 22718, passed in March 2008 by the Superior Electoral Tribunal, determined that electoral campaigns and advertisements could only be posted on the candidates’ web pages. It barred electoral campaigns from using such tools as Orkut, YouTube, e-mail, and SMS to circulate their political messages.¹⁷ At least one case was reported in which a candidate in local elections was forced to close her Orkut account and suspend YouTube videos promoting her candidacy.¹⁸ The regulations also prohibited campaigns from buying advertising space on the internet. ISPs reportedly tried to overcome this resolution but were unsuccessful. In a related case, in July 2008 the Rio de Janeiro Regional Electoral Court demanded that bloggers delete banners they had displayed on their sites to support mayoral candidate Fernando Gabeira. After a public outcry, however, the judge reversed the decision the following day, reinforcing the interpretation that the regulations applied to campaigning by candidates themselves, rather than their supporters.¹⁹

There are generally no limitations on national or international news sources, and individuals are able to use the internet, mobile technology, and other ICTs as sources of information.²⁰ Blogs, photo-blogs, social-networking platforms, and citizen journalism have proliferated in recent years.²¹ Over 80 percent of adult internet users visited social-networking sites in 2008, one of the highest such rates in the world.²² While more and more Brazilians are using Facebook, Orkut remains the most popular of these platforms. Academic institutions have also begun using the internet to share information, presenting the results of scientific and academic research in online formats, adopting open-access strategies for many leading journals, and publishing public universities’ theses and monographs. Another recent phenomenon has been the growing number of blogs written by policemen with the apparent intention of increasing transparency and building trust among the public.

The internet is widely used for social mobilization and campaigns. Examples include the Open and Free software movements, the AIDS and Access to Knowledge movement, and the gay rights movement. In addition, mobile phones have become a major tool for organizing events like the annual gay parade in Sao Paulo, as well as a means for distributing images related to violence in the country’s streets. The internet has especially been used by the blogging community and others as a vehicle for protesting government policies and judicial decisions that are perceived as threats to online expression. Thousands of internet users launched an e-mail protest against the ban on YouTube, and a “No to the Ban” blog was created in response to concerns that the country’s main blog-hosting platform, Wordpress, would be blocked by the courts.²³ An online petition in defense of free speech and against the proposed cybercrimes bill garnered 58,000 signatures in its first week.²⁴

Violations of Users’ Rights

While free speech is protected in the constitution, contradictory provisions and several legal rulings in favor of censorship during the coverage period have raised concerns that challenges to free expression affecting the traditional media may also be applied to online content. The constitution and federal law preserve freedom of speech as well as cultural and religious expression. Specific laws also establish freedom of the press. However, some legislation limits aspects of these rights, and the constitution outlines a particularly complex legal framework, especially regarding online speech.²⁵ For example, free expression of thought is assured and anonymity is formally forbidden in the same paragraph.²⁶

Civil and administrative charges against ISPs, online news journals, and some bloggers have become regular occurrences in the judicial system in recent years.²⁷ In addition to the cases mentioned above, Google Brazil and some of its services, such as Orkut and YouTube, have been the target of numerous judicial demands. In one incident, Google was required to take down Orkut communities that were seen as offensive to Edir Macedo, an evangelical minister.²⁸ Actress Preta Gil sued the company for linking her with the term “fat actress,” and in another case Google Brazil was ordered to compensate a woman after she was called a “deadbeat” on Orkut. The popular networking site has also been penalized for allowing fake profiles; a lawyer from Santa Catarina state was arrested for using such a profile. The authorities have threatened in the past to block access to the Wordpress blogging site, a result of their inability to censor specific web addresses.²⁹

Individual bloggers have also faced lawsuits by politicians. More than 25 defamation suits have been brought against blogger Alcinea Cavalcanti, the majority of them initiated by Senator Jose Sarney, who felt personally offended by the content of several postings.³⁰ Such official use of the courts to silence critics was discussed during a recent public hearing of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights at the Organization of American States (OAS). The Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (ABRAJI) called on the commission to review the laws and judicial practices that violate freedom of expression in Brazil; any ruling on the issue by the commission would affect both traditional and online media.³¹

An ongoing concern for freedom of expression advocates in the country has been the cybercrimes bill,³² which was first introduced in 2006 by Senator Eduardo Azeredo.³³ Following pressure from the public, certain provisions that were included in the initial version, such as requirements for user registration, have reportedly been dropped. Nevertheless, the bill in its current form would still restrict technologies like open wi-fi networks and oblige ISPs to record user information and keep it for three years. It also allows providers to check for copyright infringements in data sent via peer-to-peer connections, along with other threats to users’ right to privacy.³⁴ Ronaldo Lemos, director of the Center for Technology & Society at the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) Law School, has raised concerns over the text’s vagueness, its unpredictable consequences, and the possibility that if it is passed, users could be criminally liable for trivial actions conducted over the internet and punishable with prison terms as long as four years.³⁵ In July 2008 the Senate passed the bill, which then went to the House of Representatives, where it remained at year’s end.

Surveillance of internet activities is not a significant concern in Brazil. Specific laws allow for surveillance, but only when authorized by judicial orders under due process. Nevertheless, surveillance of telephones, including mobile phones, has reportedly been used more extensively in recent years. In 2007, the number of wiretaps was estimated at between 300,000 and 409,000, and most were apparently carried out without a judicial order.³⁶ In addition, the Federal Police and a private software company developed a wiretapping system called Guardião (Guardian). This system was criticized after the disclosure of some of its capabilities, such as the remote and automated monitoring of up to 3,000 telephone lines, whether fixed and mobile.³⁷

While traditional media workers are often victims of violence and death threats in Brazil, such attacks have yet to extend significantly to online journalists, bloggers, and commentators.³⁸ Nonetheless, bloggers who report on police corruption and related issues are targeted from time to time, and the overall environment of intimidation contributes to self-censorship among them. Average users express themselves quite freely.

1Brazil Internet States and Telecom Market Report, http://www.internetworldstats.com/sa/br.htm accessed on March 26, 2009

2 “Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v8.2”, Zakon Group LLC, http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ accessed on March 26, 2009, and The Brazilian Green Book on the Information Society that brings the national backbone map: http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/18878.html accessed om March 26, 2009 and http://www.rnp.br/backbone/index.php accessed on March 26, 2009

3 “Neovia and Redline initiate US$30 million WiMAX network in Brazil”, WiMAX Industry, August 2, 2007, http://www.wimax-industry.com/pr/7p.htm accessed on March 26, 2009; and http://www.teleco.com.br/cidadesdigitais.asp accessed on March 26, 2009

4 “In Brazil, Internet Access Grows Rapidly, Even Among Poor”, World Politics Review, April 3, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1891 accessed on March 26, 2009

5 “Brazil-Internet and Broadband Market”, Research and Markets, December 2008, http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reportinfo.asp?report_id=680153 accessed on March 26, 2009

6 http://www.teleco.com.br/ncel.asp accessed on March 26, 2009

7 “YouTube Does Brazil”, OpenNet Initiative, January 10, 2007, http://opennet.net/blog/2007/01/youtube-does-brazil, accessed on March 26, 2009

8 http://idgnow.uol.com.br/internet/2007/01/09/idgnoticia.2007-01-09.9436244203/IDGNoticia_view accessed on March 26, 2009 ; and “Brazil court revises ban on YouTube over sex video”, Reuters, January 9, 2007 http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSN0948365620070109 accessed on March 26, 2009

“YouTube wins Cicarelli (Brazilian model beach sex video) case”, Boing Boing, June 27, 2007, http://www.boingboing.net/2007/06/27/youtube-wins-cicarel.html accessed on March 26, 2009

9 “Brazil court orders ISPs to block access to Wordpress blog”, OpenNet Initiative, April 10, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/04/brazil-court-orders-isps-block-access-wordpress-blog access on March 26, 2009

10 “Broadband in Brazil Exceeds 8.1 Million Connections”, Cisco, March 5, 2008, http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2008/prod_030508b.html accessed on March 26, 2009

11 http://www.teleco.com.br/blarga.asp Accessed on March 26, 2009

12 “Reforms in Brazilian Telecommunications Regulations and their Impact on Sector Competition”, Global Competition Review, http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/9/sections/31/chapters/361/reforms-brazilian-telecommunications-regulations-impact-sector-competition accessed on March 26, 2009 ^and “Legislation Documents of the Telecommunications in Brazil”, Telesco, http://www.teleco.com.br/en/en_legis.asp accessed on March 26, 2009

13 Brazilian Internet Steering Committee, http://www.cg.org.br/internacional/index.htm accessed on March 26, 2009

14 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2008 Brazil country report

15 “Electoral judge orders website to remove report on Worker's Party candidate”, IFEX, October 22, 2008, www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/97808/ accessed on 3/19/2009

16 “Brazil: Inventive censorship, and the case for anonymity”, Global Vocies, September 7, 2008,http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/09/07/brazil-inventive-censorship-and-the-case-for-anonymity/ accessed on March 26, 2009

17“Brazil: Blogs banned from the 2008 elections”,Global Voices, March 30, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/03/30/brazil-blogs-banned-from-the-2008-elections/ accessed on March 26, 2009 and http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/index.html Accessed on March 26, 2009 and “Orkut Brazil warns users against political showdown regarding upcoming elections”, Orkut Plus, September 14, 2008, http://www.orkutplus.net/2008/09/orkut-brazil-warns-users-against-political-showdown-regarding-upcoming-elections.html accessed on March 26, 2009

18 “Brazil: Electoral censorship at work”, Global Voices, July 22, 2009, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/22/brazil-electoral-censorship-at-work/ accessed on March 26, 2009

19 “Brazil: First blog falls victim to electoral law”, Global Voices, June 1, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/06/01/brazil-first-blog-falls-victim-to-electoral-law accessed on March 26, 2009

20 Brazil National Online Newspapers eNews Reference, http://www.enewsreference.com/newspaper/brazina.htm accessed on March 26, 2009

21 (Some top ranked Brazilian blogs can be seen here) http://colunistas.ig.com.br/metablog/2008/05/05/os-blogs-mais-acessados-do-brasil Accessed on March 26, 2009; and http://www.interney.net/?p=9760065 accessed on March 26, 2009; and “Eighty Five Percent of Brazilian Internet Users Visited a Social Networking Site in September 2008”, ComScore, November 19, 2008, http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2592 accessed on March 26, 2009

22 “Eighty Five Percent of Brazilian Internet Users Visited a Social Networking Site in September 2008”, http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2592 accessed on March 26, 2009

23“Brazil: Bloggers united against Wordpress ban”, Global Voices, April 12, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/04/12/brazil-bloggers-united-against-wordpress-ban accessed on March 26, 2009

24 http://www.petitiononline.com/veto2008/petition.html Accessed on March 26, 2009;and “Brazil: Bloggers question the 13 new cyber-crimes”, Global Voices, July 17, 2008, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/17/brazil-bloggers-question-the-13-new-cyber-crimes/ accessed on March 26, 2009

25 “Constitution of Brazil”, Brazil Information, http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html Accessed on March 26, 2009

26 “Brazil: Inventive censorship, and the case for anonymity”, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/09/07/brazil-inventive-censorship-and-the-case-for-anonymity accessed on March 26, 2009

27For more information see:http://globalvoicesonline.org/found/?cof=FORID%3A9&q=Brazil+and+Internet+Freedom&btnG=Search+%C2%BB&cx=000932313665553177304%3Adg67ra11mvs#1039 accessed on March 26, 2009

28 http://www.htmlstaff.org/ver.php?id=15748 accessed on March 26, 2009

29 “Brazil: Bloggers united against Wordpress ban”, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/04/12/brazil-bloggers-united-against-wordpress-ban accessed on 3/19/2009

30 FotP Brazil (2008)

31 “Press release on OAS hearing”, ABRAJI, November 11, 2008, http://www.abraji.org.br/?id=90&id_noticia=612 ; and http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/site_search.php?keyword=Brazil accessed on March 26, 2009

32 “Censura Não!: Brazilian Bloggers Protest New Cybercrime Bill”, OpenNet Initiative, July 25, 2008, http://opennet.net/blog/2008/07/censura-n%C3%A3o-brazilian-bloggers-protest-new-cybercrime-bill ; and “Legislators urged to oppose cyber-crime bill likely to threaten online free expression”, Reporters Without Borders, July 23, 2008, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=27917 accessed on March 26, 2009

33 “Brazil: Bloggers question the 13 new cyber-crimes”,http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/07/17/brazil-bloggers-question-the-13-new-cyber-crimes/ accessed on March 26, 2009; and “Brazilian Cybercrime bill needs more transparency”, Safernet Brasil, June 17, 2007, http://www.safernet.org.br/site/noticias/brazilian-cybercrime-bill-needs-more-transparency accessed on March 26, 2009

34 “Access versus surveillance: Brazilian cybercrime law project” , iCommons, November 5, 2008, http://icommons.org/articles/access-versus-surveillance-brazilian-cybercrime-law-project accessed on March 26, 2009

35 http://a2kbrasil.org.br/Esclareca-suas-Duvidas-sobre-os

36 http://www.conjur.com.br/static/text/60835,1 accessed on March 26, 2009; and http://www.fecomercio.com.br/pagina.php?tipo=21&pg=675 accessed on March 26, 2009

37http://www2.oabsp.org.br/asp/jornal/materias.asp?edicao=113&pagina=3117&tds=7&sub=0&sub2=0&pgNovo=67 accessed on March 26, 2009

38 FotP Brazil (2008).

Estonia IGIF 2009

Freedom House Freedom on the Net

Estonia

Population: 1.3 million

Internet Users/Penetration 2006: 690 thousand / 52 percent

Internet Users/Penetration 2008: 852 thousand / 64 percent

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2006: 1.7 million

Mobile Phone Users/Penetration 2008: 1.9 million

Freedom of the Press (2008) Score/Status: 16 / Free

Digital Opportunity Index (2006) Ranking: 24 out of 181

GNI Per Capita (PPP): $19,800

Web 2.0 Applications Blocked: No

Political Content Systematically Filtered: No

Bloggers/Online Journalists Arrested: No

Status: Free

Obstacles to Access: 2 (0–25)

Limits on Content: 2 (0–35)

Violations of User Rights: 6 (0–40)

Total Score: 45 (0–100)

Introduction

Estonia ranks among the most wired and technologically advanced countries in the world. The first internet connections in the country were introduced in 1992 in Tallinn and Tartu academic facilities. According to Estonia’s president, the country’s status as an “e-country” is due in large part to the disastrous condition of the country’s infrastructure in 1991 following nearly 50 years of Soviet control.¹ In an effort to integrate Estonia into the global economy, the government initiated a program entitled Tiger Leap that aimed to computerize and connect all Estonian schools with the internet by 2000. This program helped to build competence and awareness about information and communication technologies (ICTs). Today, with such a high level of computer literacy and connectivity, focus has shifted from basic concerns such as access, quality, and cost of internet services to discussions about security, anonymity, the protection of private information, and citizens’ rights on the internet. These issues are closely tied to the most serious threat to internet freedom in Estonia, namely, the cyber attacks against various Estonian communication infrastructures in late April and early May 2007.

Obstacles to Access

The number of internet and mobile phone users in Estonia has grown rapidly in the past 15 years. The internet is regularly accessed by two-thirds of Estonian’s population, or approximately 852,000 people;² 58 percent of households have internet access, and virtually all of them (90 percent) have a broadband connection.³ There are also 1.9 million mobile phone subscribers—600,000 more than Estonia’s population. The first public WiFi covered area was launched in 2001, and since then the country has developed a system of 2.5G and 3G mobile data networks that enable widespread wireless broadband access. In August 2008, the government announced that by 2009 the country would have 2,000 free certified WiFi covered areas meant for public use, including cafés, hotels, motels, and even gas stations.⁴ In addition, the countrywide wireless internet service based on CDMA technology—which propagates very well due to the use of a low radio frequency—has been deployed and priced to compete with fixed broadband access. Municipalities in rural areas have been subsidizing local wireless internet deployment efforts, and the country’s regulatory framework enables local start-ups to provide service with low barriers to entry. Estonians use the internet for a large variety of activities, including search engines (85 percent of users), e-mail (83 percent of users), local online media, news portals, social networking sites, instant messaging, and internet voice communication solutions.⁵ Additionally, 83 percent of the population uses the internet for online banking—the second highest percentage in the European Union.⁶ Estonian Public Broadcasting delivers all radio channels in real time over the internet, including audio archives of its radio and television programs, at no charge to users. Emphasis on communication and social media services are an increasing trend. YouTube, Facebook, LinkedIn, Orkut and many other global streaming media and social networking sites are widely available and used.

Data communication has not been the subject of telecommunications service monopoly. The Estonian Electronic Communications Act was created to help develop and promote a free market and fair competition in electronic communications services.⁷ Today there are over 200 operators that provide a variety of data communication services in Estonia. In 2008, there were eight mobile phone companies, including Elisa, Tele2, and EMT, and numerous major internet-service providers (ISPs), including EENET and Eunet. ISPs and other communications providers are required to register with the Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority (ETSA), a branch of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, although there is no registration fee.⁸

Limits on Content

Limits on internet content and communication in Estonia are among the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, due in part to Estonia’s thorough privacy laws, there are some instances of content removal. Most of these cases are related to civil court orders concerning cases where inappropriate comments or comments unrelated to the posted article were made. This practice also applies to online comments in forums or on web pages where no registration is needed, although IP addresses can be monitored. Generally, users are informed as to the media portals’ privacy policy and regulations for commenting and are expected to follow the instructions. In 2008, the debate over self-censoring or pre-publication censorship took center stage in a court case where the victim of unflattering and largely anonymous comments to a news story filed suit claiming that web portals must be responsible for comments made by readers and must edit them before they become public.⁹ Web portals say that this is impossible, since they do not have the capacity to monitor and edit all comments made on their sites. The Estonian courts have ruled in favor of the plaintiff, thereby making web portals responsible for all comments posted, but the ruling is being appealed.¹⁰

There are over 40,000 active Estonian language blogs on the internet, including an increasing number of group, project, and corporate blogs. The vibrancy of the blogosphere and its activities are frequently covered by traditional media, particularly when blog discussions surround civic activity. The fact that so many Estonians are both computer literate and connected to the internet has created a unique opportunity for the Estonian government. In addition to hosting virtual trade fairs and an online embassy, the Estonian president’s office has its own YouTube Channel, complete with messages released exclusively on YouTube.¹¹ Estonia has the largest functioning public key infrastructure in Europe, based on the use of electronic certificates maintained on the national ID card.¹² More than 80 percent of the population possesses the ID card that enables both electronic authentication and digital signing. Relevant legislation is in place, giving the digital signature equal power with the handwritten one and imposing a responsibility on public authorities to accept digitally signed documents. Estonian ID cards have been used to facilitate electronic voting during parliamentary elections in 2007, and they will be used again in 2009 municipal and European Parliament elections.¹³ In 2008, over 86 percent of citizens filed their taxes over the internet, making the online services offered by the tax department the most popular public e-service.

In April 2007, blogs and SMS messaging played an important role in the protests over the removal of a Soviet war monument. While it was known that the Estonian government would remove the monument, no official announcement had been made. When the police cordoned off the area and covered the monument, word quickly spread via mobile phone, SMS, and the internet, and within a few hours the crowd had grown to several thousand.¹⁴ Two days of rioting followed, mostly by ethnic Russians. However, as the physical violence receded, an unprecedented wave of cyber attacks against the Estonian government began. These “dedicated denial of service” (DDoS) attacks affected all of the government’s websites, Estonia’s largest bank, and several sites of daily newspapers. Because of Estonia’s level of connectivity, even simple transactions like reading e-mail, online banking, and paying for a parking space were impossible. Officials were finally forced to block access to Estonian sites from IP addresses outside of Estonia in an effort to stop the attacks.¹⁵ Throughout the three-week period of unrest, internet appeals and SMS messages continued to call for protests against the Estonian government.¹⁶

Violations of Users’ Rights

Freedom of speech and freedom of expression are strongly protected by Estonia’s constitution and by its membership in the European Union (EU). Anonymity is allowed, and discussions on anonymity and the respectful use of the internet have been widespread. Internet access at public access points can be obtained without prior registration. In 1996, Estonia enacted the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) which protects an individual’s personal data from collection and dissemination for public use. Any data that is considered sensitive—political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, ethnic or racial origin, sexual behavior, health, criminal convictions, etc.—cannot be processed without the consent of the individual. The Data Protection Inspectorate (DPI) is the supervisory authority for the PDPA with an objective of “state supervision of the processing of personal data, management of databases and access to public information.”¹⁷ However, as a member state of the European Union, Estonia is under pressure to implement the EU Data Retention Directive that requires ISPs and other telecommunications providers to retain customer data for a period of no less than six months and no longer than two years. The EU adopted the Directive in March 2006. However, Estonia chose to postpone the implementation of the Directive for 36 months.¹⁸ At the time of this report, the postponement was still in place.

There have been no physical attacks against bloggers or online journalists in Estonia, but online discussions are sometimes inflammatory. Following instances of cyber bullying, sexual harassment, and misuse of social media, discussions and public awareness campaigns were launched to raise parental involvement and increase child protection on the internet. Awareness of the importance of the security of ICTs both in private and business use has been raised significantly after cyber attacks took place against Estonia in May 2007. Recently, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of NATO was established in Estonia to improve cyber defense interoperability and to provide cyber defense support for all NATO members.¹⁹ Tartu University and Tallinn University of Technology have also announced that they are launching the world’s first Master’s program in cyber defense.²⁰

1 “Estonia Became Internet Savvy “Thanks” to Occupation,” Baltic News Service, April 15, 2008.

2 ITU, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Default.aspx.

3 http://www.stat.ee/18959, accessed December 2008.

4 “Estonia to have 2,000 public WiFi by 2009,” Estonian Review, http://brilliantfixer.wordpress.com/2008/08/08/estonia-to-have-2000-public-wifi-areas-by-2009/, accessed March 25, 2009.

5 http://www.nlib.ee/html/yritus/infofrm3/ipf_pille_runnel.ppt , accessed February 2009.

6 “Estonians tend to avoid e-shopping – survey,” Baltic News Service, February 8, 2008.

7 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, http://www.mkm.ee/index.php?id=9576 , accessed March 26, 2009.

8 Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority, Commencement of Provision of Communications Service, http://www.tji.ee/?id=13110, accessed March 26, 2009.

9 “Big businessman goes to war against web portals,” Baltic Business News, March 18, 2008, http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/Default2.aspx?ArticleID=48694078-50cc-4fe1-b3e4-6e10bc6a5ec1.

10 “Delfi plans to appeal against the ruling favoring Vjacheslav Leedo,” Baltic News, June 30, 2008, http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/Default2.aspx?ArticleID=96dfdecf-baa5-4c68-b112-1fa3a8bf257f.

11 “Estonia launches embassy in virtual world Second Life,” Agence France Presse, December 4, 2007, and http://shaan.typepad.com/shaanou/2008/12/estonian-president-launches-youtube-video-blog.html.

12 http://id.ee/?lang=en.

13 http://www.vvk.ee/engindex.html.

14 Global Voices Online, “A Russia Rebellion,” http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/04/27/estonia-a-russian-rebellion/, accessed March 24, 2009.

15 “Estonia hit by Moscow cyber war,” BBC, May 17, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm.

16 “Estonia launches probe into Internet call for armed uprising,” Agence France Presse, May 3, 2007.

17 EPIC Human Rights Report, http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/EPICPrivHR/2006/PHR2006-Republic-8.html, accessed March 24, 2009.

18 DIRECTIVE 2006/24/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, Official Journal of the European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_105/l_10520060413en00540063.pdf, March 24, 2009.

19 NATO Transformation Network, http://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNCC/CentresofE/CCD.

20 “Estonian universities to launch Master’s programmes in cyber defence,” Estonian Review, October 10, 2008.